person. For to say, as the most plausible of them did, "That
happiness consisted in virtue," was but vain babbling, and a mere
sound of words to amuse others and themselves; because they were not
agreed what this virtue was or wherein it did consist; and likewise,
because several among the best of them taught quite different
things, placing happiness in health or good fortune, in riches or in
honour, where all were agreed that virtue was not, as I shall have
occasion to show when I speak of their particular tenets.

The second great defect in the Gentile philosophy was that it wanted
some suitable reward proportioned to the better part of man--his
mind, as an encouragement for his progress in virtue. The
difficulties they met with upon the score of this default were
great, and not to be accounted for; bodily goods, being only
suitable to bodily wants, are no rest at all for the mind; and if
they were, yet are they not the proper fruits of wisdom and virtue,
being equally attainable by the ignorant and wicked. Now human
nature is so constituted that we can never pursue anything heartily
but upon hopes of a reward. If we run a race, it is in expectation
of a prize; and the greater the prize the faster we run; for an
incorruptible crown, if we understand it and believe it to be such,
more than a corruptible one. But some of the philosophers gave all
this quite another turn, and pretended to refine so far as to call
virtue its own reward, and worthy to be followed only for itself;
whereas, if there be anything in this more than the sound of the
words, it is at least too abstracted to become a universal
influencing principle in the world, and therefore could not be of
general use.

It was the want of assigning some happiness proportioned to the soul