But throughout this campaign, the responsibility was entirely, almost
ostentatiously, thrown by the States-General upon their commander-in-
chief, and, as already indicated, their preparations in the spring and
early summer had been entirely inadequate. Should he lose the army with
which he had so quietly but completely checked Spinola in all his really
important moves during the summer and autumn, he might despair of putting
another very soon into the field. That his force in that November week
before Groll was numerically far superior to the enemy is certain, but he
had lost confidence in his cavalry since their bad behaviour at Mulheim
the previous year, and a very large proportion of his infantry was on the
sick-list at the moment of Spinola's approach. "Lest the continual bad
weather should entirely consume the army," he said, "we are resolved,
within a day or two after we have removed the sick who are here in great
numbers, to break up, unless the enemy should give us occasion to make
some attempt upon him."

Maurice was the servant of a small republic, contending single-handed
against an empire still considered the most formidable power in the
world. His cue was not necessarily to fight on all occasions; for delay
often fights better than an army against a foreign invader. When a
battle and a victory were absolutely necessary we have seen the
magnificent calmness which at Nieuport secured triumph under the shadow
of death. Had he accepted Spinola's challenge in November, he would
probably have defeated him and have taken Groll. He might not, however,
have annihilated his adversary, who, even when worsted, would perhaps
have effected his escape. The city was of small value to the republic.
The principal advantage of a victory would have been increased military
renown for himself. Viewed in this light, there is something almost
sublime in the phlegmatic and perfectly republican composure with which