commissioners to yield.

The States-General were not likely to be deficient in firmness. They
felt that the republic was exactly on the point of wresting the control
of the East from the hands of the Portuguese, and they were not inclined
to throw away the harvest of their previous labours just as it was
ripening. Ten thousand persons at least, besides the sailors employed,
were directly interested in the traffic, most of whom possessed great
influence in the commonwealth, and would cause great domestic dissension
should they now be sacrificed to Spain. To keep the India trade was the
best guarantee for the future possession of the traffic to Spain; for the
Spanish Government would never venture an embargo upon the direct
intercourse between the provinces and its own dominions, for fear
of vengeance in the East. On the other hand, by denouncing oceanic
commerce, they would soon find themselves without a navy at all, and
their peaceful coasting ships would be at the mercy of Spain or of any
power possessing that maritime energy which would have been killed in the
republic. By abandoning the ocean, the young commonwealth would sink
into sloth, and become the just object of contempt to the world. It
would cease to be an independent power, and deserve to fall a prey to any
enterprising neighbour.

Even Villeroy admitted the common belief to be, that if the India trade
were abandoned "the States would melt away like snow in the sun." He
would not, on that account, however, counsel to the States obstinacy upon
the subject, if Spain refused peace or truce except on condition of their
exclusion from the traffic. Jeannin, Villeroy, and their master; Isaac
le Maire and Peter Plancius, could have told the reason why if they had
chosen.