duty; but another part branched off by the way and carried their
services, and Tamasese's dear-bought guns, to Faleula.

On the 8th, there was a defection of a different kind, but yet sensible.
The High Chief Seumanu had been still detained in Mulinuu under anxious
observation. His people murmured at his absence, threatened to "take
away his name," and had already attempted a rescue. The adventure was
now taken in hand by his wife Faatulia, a woman of much sense and spirit
and a strong partisan; and by her contrivance, Seumanu gave his guardians
the slip and rejoined his clan at Faleula. This process of winnowing was
of course counterbalanced by another of recruitment. But the harshness
of European and military rule had made Brandeis detested and Tamasese
unpopular with many; and the force on Mulinuu is thought to have done
little more than hold its own. Mataafa sympathisers set it down at about
two or three thousand. I have no estimate from the other side; but
Becker admits they were not strong enough to keep the field in the open.

The political significance of Mulinuu was great, but in a military sense
the position had defects. If it was difficult to carry, it was easy to
blockade: and to be hemmed in on that narrow finger of land were an
inglorious posture for the monarch of Samoa. The peninsula, besides, was
scant of food and destitute of water. Pressed by these considerations,
Brandeis extended his lines till he had occupied the whole foreshore of
Apia bay and the opposite point, Matautu. His men were thus drawn out
along some three nautical miles of irregular beach, everywhere with their
backs to the sea, and without means of communication or mutual support
except by water. The extension led to fresh sorrows. The Tamasese men
quartered themselves in the houses of the absent men of the Vaimaunga.
Disputes arose with English and Americans. Leary interposed in a loud
voice of menace. It was said the firm profited by the confusion to