intriguing, or pretending to intrigue, with Mataafa. In his despatch of
the 11th, he had given an extended criticism of that chieftain, whom he
depicts as very dark and artful; and while admitting that his assumption
of the name of Malietoa might raise him up followers, predicted that he
could not make an orderly government or support himself long in sole
power "without very energetic foreign help." Of what help was the consul
thinking? There was no helper in the field but Germany. On the 15th he
had an interview with the victor; told him that Tamasese's was the only
government recognised by Germany, and that he must continue to recognise
it till he received "other instructions from his government, whom he was
now advising of the late events"; refused, accordingly, to withdraw the
guard from the isthmus; and desired Mataafa, "until the arrival of these
fresh instructions," to refrain from an attack on Mulinuu. One thing of
two: either this language is extremely perfidious, or Becker was
preparing to change sides. The same detachment appears in his despatch
of October 7th. He computes the losses of the German firm with an easy
cheerfulness. If Tamasese get up again (_gelingt die Wiederherstellung
der Regierung Tamasese's_), Tamasese will have to pay. If not, then
Mataafa. This is not the language of a partisan. The tone of
indifference, the easy implication that the case of Tamasese was already
desperate, the hopes held secretly forth to Mataafa and secretly reported
to his government at home, trenchantly contrast with his external
conduct. At this very time he was feeding Tamasese; he had German
sailors mounting guard on Tamasese's battlements; the German war-ship lay
close in, whether to help or to destroy. If he meant to drop the cause
of Tamasese, he had him in a corner, helpless, and could stifle him
without a sob. If he meant to rat, it was to be with every condition of
safety and every circumstance of infamy.

Was it conceivable, then, that he meant it? Speaking with a gentleman