the object of sense as a stone moving downhill; and all men in their
senses are as capable of seeing and judging and reporting the fact in
one case, as in the other. Should a man then tell you, that he saw a
stone go uphill of its own accord, you might question his veracity; but
you could not say the thing admitted no evidence, because it was
contrary to the law and usual course of nature; for the law of nature
formed to yourself from your own experience and reasoning is quite
independent of the matter of fact which the man testifies: and
whenever you see facts yourself, which contradict your notions of the
law of nature, you admit the facts, because you believe yourself; when
you do not admit like facts upon the evidence of others, it is because
you do not believe them, and not because the facts in their own nature
exclude all evidence.

Suppose a man should tell you, that he was come from the dead,
you would be apt to suspect his evidence. But what would you suspect?
That he was not alive when you heard him, saw him, felt him, and
conversed with him? You could not suspect this, without giving up all
your senses and acting in this case as you act in no other. Here then
you would question, whether the man had ever been dead? But would you
say, that it is incapable of being made plain by human testimony, that
this or that man died a year ago? It can't be said. Evidence in this
case is admitted in all courts perpetually

Consider it the other way. Suppose you saw a man publicly
executed, his body afterwards was wounded by the executioner, and
carried and laid in the grave; that after this you should be told, that
the man was come to life again; what would you suspect in this case?
Not that the man had never been dead; for that you saw yourself: but
you would suspect whether he was now alive. But would you say this