talk of their own prejudices and imaginations; and that sense and
reason are not so much concerned in the case as the Gentleman imagines.
For I ask, Is it from the evidence of sense, or the evidence of reason
that people of warm climates think it contrary to nature, that water
should grow solid, and become ice? As for sense, they see indeed that
water with them is always liquid; but none of their senses tell them
that it can never grow solid. As for reason, it can never so inform
them; for right reason can never contradict the truth of things. Our
senses then inform us rightly what the usual course of things is; but
when we conclude that things cannot be otherwise, we outrun the
information of our senses, and the conclusion stands upon prejudice,
and not upon reason. And yet such conclusions form what is generally
called the course of nature. And when men upon proper evidence and
informations admit things contrary to this presupposed course of
nature, they do not, as the Gentleman expresses it, quit their own
sense and reason; but, in truth, they quit their own mistakes and
prejudices.

In the case before us, the case of the resurrection, the great
difficulty arises from the like prejudice. We all know by experience
that all men die, and rise no more; therefore we conclude, that for a
dead man to rise to life again, is contrary to the course of nature.
And certainly it is contrary to the uniform and settled course of
things. But if we argue from hence that it is contrary and repugnant
to the real laws of nature and absolutely impossible on that account,
we argue without any foundation to support us either from our senses or
our reason. We cannot learn from our eyes, or feeling, or any other
sense, that it is impossible for a dead body to live again; if we learn
it at all, it must be from our reason; and yet what one maxim of
reason is contradicted by the supposition of a resurrection? For my