must we say, then? All these sufferers had not truth with them; and
yet, if there be any weight in this argument from suffering they have
all the right to plead it.

But I may be told, perhaps, that men by their sufferings, though
they do not prove their doctrines to be true, yet prove at least their
own sincerity: as if it were a thing impossible for men to dissemble at
the point of death. Alas! how many instances are there of men's denying
facts plainly proved, asserting facts plainly disproved, even with the
rope around their necks? Must all such pass for innocent sufferers,
sincere men? If not, it must be allowed, that a man's word at the
point of death is not always to be relied on.

Another observation I would make, is with respect to the evidence
of the Spirit, on which so much stress is laid. It has been hitherto
insisted on, that the resurrection was a matter of fact, and such a
fact as was capable and proper to be supported by the evidence of
sense. How comes it about, that this evidence, this which is the
proper evidence, is given up as insufficient, and a new improper
evidence introduced? Is it not surprising, that one great miracle
should want an hundred more to prove it? Every miracle is itself an
appeal to sense, and therefore admits no evidence but that of sense.
And there is no connexion between a miracle done this year and last
year. It does not follow, therefore, because Peter cured a lame man,
(allowing the fact), that therefore Christ rose from the dead.

But allowing the Gentleman all he demands, what is to us? They
who had the witness within them, did perhaps very well to consult, and
to take his word; but how am I, or others, who have not this witness is
us, the better for it? If the first ages of the church saw all the