The Critique of Practical Reason by Immanuel Kant
page 19 of 213 (08%)
page 19 of 213 (08%)
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the order in the subdivision of the Analytic will be the reverse of
that in the critique of the pure speculative reason. For, in the present case, we shall commence with the principles and proceed to the concepts, and only then, if possible, to the senses; whereas in the case of the speculative reason we began with the senses and had to end with the principles. The reason of this lies again in this: that now we have to do with a will, and have to consider reason, not in its relation to objects, but to this will and its causality. We must, then, begin with the principles of a causality not empirically conditioned, after which the attempt can be made to establish our notions of the determining grounds of such a will, of their application to objects, and finally to the subject and its sense faculty. We necessarily begin with the law of causality from freedom, that is, with a pure practical principle, and this determines the objects to which alone it can be applied. BOOK_1|CHAPTER_1 FIRST PART. ELEMENTS OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON. BOOK I. The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. |
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