external and those of internal freedom; the latter of which alone
are ethical. Hence this internal freedom which is the condition of all
ethical duty must be discussed as a preliminary (discursus
praeliminaris), just as above the doctrine of conscience was discussed
as the condition of all duty.



{INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 185}

REMARKS



Of the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle Of Internal Freedom.



Habit (habitus) is a facility of action and a subjective
perfection of the elective will. But not every such facility is a free
habit (habitus libertatis); for if it is custom (assuetudo), that
is, a uniformity of action which, by frequent repetition, has become a
necessity, then it is not a habit proceeding from freedom, and
therefore not a moral habit. Virtue therefore cannot be defined as a
habit of free law-abiding actions, unless indeed we add "determining
itself in its action by the idea of the law"; and then this habit is
not a property of the elective will, but of the rational will, which
is a faculty that in adopting a rule also declares it to be a
universal law, and it is only such a habit that can be reckoned as
virtue. Two things are required for internal freedom: to be master