surprising his enemy, upon fighting a defensive battle, Hooker, early on
Saturday morning, examined his lines, and made sundry changes in the
forces under his command.

The position he occupied, according to Gen. Lee, was one of great
natural strength, on ground covered with dense forest and tangled
under-growth, behind breastworks of logs and an impenetrable abattis,
and approached by few roads, all easily swept by artillery. And,
while it is true that the position was difficult to carry by direct
assault, full compensation existed in other tactical advantages to the
army taking the offensive. It is not probable that Lee, in Hooker's
place, would have selected such ground. "Once in the wood, it was
difficult to tell any thing at one hundred yards. Troops could not
march without inextricable confusion." Despite which fact, however,
the density of these very woods was the main cause of Lee's success.

In this position, Hooker awaited the assault of his vigorous opponent.
As in all defensive battles, he was at certain disadvantages, and
peculiarly so in this case, owing to the terrain he had chosen, or been
forced to choose by Friday's easily accepted check. There were no
debouches for throwing forces upon Lee, should he wish to assume the
offensive. There was no ground for manoeuvring. The woods were like a
heavy curtain in his front. His left wing was placed so as to be of
absolutely no value. His right flank was in the air. One of the roads
on which he must depend for retreat was readily assailable by the enemy.
And he had in his rear a treacherous river, which after a few hours'
rain might become impassable, with but a single road and ford secured to
him with reasonable certainty.

And, prone as we had always been to act upon unwarrantable over-