thousand men; but Hooker, with his knowledge of Lee's strength, could
not estimate it at more than twenty-five thousand by any calculation he
could make. Himself had over seventy thousand men in line, and ready to
mass on any given point. He ought to have known that Lee was too astute
a tactician seriously to attack him in front, while Jackson was
manoeuvring to gain his right. And all Lee's conduct during the day was
palpable evidence that he was seeking to gain time.

However much Hooker may have believed that Jackson was retreating,
he was bound to guard against the possibility of an attack, knowing as
he did Jackson's whereabouts and habit of rapid mystery. Had he thrown
the entire Eleventh Corps en potence to his main line, as above
indicated, to arrest or retard an attack if made; had he drawn troops
from Meade on the extreme left, where half an hour's reconnoitring would
have shown that nothing was in his front, and from Couch's reserves in
the centre; had he thrown heavy columns out where Birney was, to prevent
the re-union of Jackson and Lee, and to make a determined attack upon
the latter's left while Hancock pressed him in front,--half the vigor
displayed in the early days of this movement would have crushed the Army
of Northern Virginia beyond recovery for this campaign. Lee's only
salvation would have lain in instant withdrawal from our front, and a
retreat towards Gordonsville to re-unite with his lieutenant.

However he might have disposed his forces for an attack on Saturday
afternoon, he could have committed no mistake as great as the half-way
measures which have been narrated. And if the heavy fighting of Sunday
had been done the day before with any thing like the dispositions
suggested, it could have scarcely failed of brilliant success for the
Army of the Potomac.