upon the right. His dispositions certainly resulted in convincing
Howard that he had done so.

But suppose Hooker still remained of the same opinion during the
afternoon, was the issue of this circular in the morning enough?
If he supposed it probable that the enemy would strike our right,
was it not the duty of the commanding general, at least to see that the
threatened flank was properly protected,--that the above order was
carried out as he intended it should be? No attack sufficient to
engross his attention had been made, or was particularly threatened
elsewhere; and a ten-minutes' gallop would bring him from headquarters
to the questionable position. He had some excellent staff-officers--
Gen. Warren among others--who could have done this duty; but there is no
evidence of any one having been sent. Gen. Howard, in fact, states that
no inspection by, or by the order of, Gen. Hooker was made during the
day, after the one in the early morning.

It may be alleged that Hooker had desired to draw in the extended right
the evening before, and had yielded only to the claim that that position
could be held against any attack coming from the front. This is true.
But when half his enemy's forces, after this disposition was made,
are moved to and massed on his right, and have actually placed
themselves where they can take his line in reverse, is it still fair to
urge this plea? Hooker claims that his "instructions were utterly and
criminally disregarded." But inasmuch as common-sense, not to quote
military routine, must hold him accountable for the removal of Barlow
(for how can a general shelter himself from the consequences of the acts
of his subordinates, when these acts are in pursuance of orders received
from his own aide-de-camp?), and himself acknowledges the disposition
made of Sickles and Slocum, can the facts be fairly said to sustain the