One cannot but wonder just where Sickles expected to find Jackson.
There can be little doubt that he did think he was about to strike
Jackson's flank. His testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of
the War constantly refers to this belief; and he says that he "was about
to open his attack in full force," was holding Pleasonton's cavalry in
hand, desiring to lead the attack with his infantry, when the news of
the disaster to the Eleventh Corps was brought to him; and that every
thing seemed to indicate the most brilliant success from thus throwing
himself upon Jackson's flank and rear. He refers to McLaws being in his
front, but this is an error. McLaws was on Lee's right flank, three
miles away. It was with Archer of Jackson's corps, and with Posey and
Wright of Anderson's division, that he had to do.

The reports are by no means clear as to the details of these movements.
Birney states in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of
the War, that he found that he and Barlow "had got into the midst of the
rebel army, the supports on the left not having come up." He therefore
formed his command into a huge square, with the artillery in the centre,
holding the road over which Jackson had passed. "The fire upon his left
flank from musketry was galling." This came from Anderson's brigades.

Hayman, Graham and Ward were pushed out along the road, and "found the
enemy in some force on three sides." This apparently shows that
Birney,--who had the immediate command of the troops in front,--was
quite uncertain of what was before him, or just what he was expected to
do.

This much is, however, clear: Jackson's small rearguard had succeeded in
holding the road which he had traversed, at some point near Welford's;
and here this force remained until Jackson was well along towards the