most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally, and
finding that McPherson was stretching out too much on his left
flank, I wrote him a note early in the morning not to extend so
much by his left; for we had not troops enough to completely invest
the place, and I intended to destroy utterly all parts of the
Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, then to withdraw from the
left flank and add to the right. In that letter I ordered
McPherson not to extend any farther to the left, but to employ
General Dodge's corps (Sixteenth), then forced out of position, to
destroy every rail and tie of the railroad, from Decatur up to his
skirmish-line, and I wanted him (McPherson) to be ready, as soon as
General Garrard returned from Covington (whither I had sent him),
to move to the extreme right of Thomas, so as to reach if possible
the railroad below Atlanta, viz., the Macon road. In the morning
we found the strong line of parapet, "Peach-Tree line," to the
front of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our lines were
advanced rapidly close up to Atlanta. For some moments I supposed
the enemy intended to evacuate, and in person was on horseback at
the head of Schofield's troops, who had advanced in front of the
Howard House to some open ground, from which we could plainly see
the whole rebel line of parapets, and I saw their men dragging up
from the intervening valley, by the distillery, trees and saplings
for abatis. Our skirmishers found the enemy down in this valley,
and we could see the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns in
position at intervals. Schofield was dressing forward his lines,
and I could hear Thomas farther to the right engaged, when General
McPherson and his staff rode up. We went back to the Howard House,
a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on the steps,
discussing the chances of battle, and of Hood's general character.
McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood,