railroad, so there would be no delay in communication. I detained cars
and locomotives enough at Burnsville to transport the whole of Ord's
command at once, and if Van Dorn had moved against Corinth instead of
Iuka I could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or
8,000 before he could have arrived. I remained at Burnsville with a
detachment of about 900 men from Ord's command and communicated with my
two wings by courier. Ord met the advance of the enemy soon after
leaving Burnsville. Quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the
rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer
killed. He maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight
the next morning. I was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch
from Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto, twenty-two miles from Iuka,
saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of
his column was not yet up as far as Jacinto. He said, however, that he
would still be at Iuka by two o'clock the next day. I did not believe
this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads,
which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are
not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. It
might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make
an assault. I immediately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans' dispatch and
ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound
of guns to the south or south-east. He was instructed to notify his
officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. During the
19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either
towards the point where Ord was, or to Burnsville where I had remained.

A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rosecrans arrived with the
head of his column at garnets, the point where the Jacinto road to Iuka
leaves the road going east. He here turned north without sending any
troops to the Fulton road. While still moving in column up the Jacinto