south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his
base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when
the battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon;
but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's
suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. On the 14th
I telegraphed him:

"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will be
ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you can hold
Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back
can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to
force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and
Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes
by every available road, to get to his supplies. Sherman would have
been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him some
thirty miles up that river to cross."

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as
follows:

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell
better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your
showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the
most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made
to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth
of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his
left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary
Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland
and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry
Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on