know. So that the better we explain the less, in the end, we know.

There can be no doubt that something is directly known but disputes
break out as soon as we try to say what that something is. Is it the
"real" world of material objects, or a mental copy of these objects,
or are we altogether on the wrong track in looking for two kinds of
realities, the "real" world and "our mental states," and is it
perceived events alone that are "real?" This something which we know
directly has been given various names: "the external object," "sense
data," "phenomena," and so on, each more or less coloured by
implications belonging to one or other of the rival theories as to
what it is. We shall call it "the facts" to emphasise its indubitable
reality, and avoid, as far as possible, any other implications.

Controversy about "the facts" has been mainly as to what position they
occupy in the total scheme of reality. As to what they are at the
moment when we are actually being acquainted with them one would have
thought there could have been no two opinions; it seems impossible
that we should make any mistake about that. No doubt it is impossible
to have such a thing as a false experience, an experience is what it
is, only judgments can be false. But it is quite possible to make a
false judgment as to what experience we are actually having, or, still
more commonly, simply to take for granted that our experience must be
such and such, without ever looking to see whether it is or not. A
small child taken to a party and told that parties are great fun if
questioned afterwards will very likely say it has enjoyed itself
though, if you happened to have been there, you may have seen clearly
that it was really bewildered or bored. Even when we grow up names
still have a tendency to impose upon us and disguise from us the
actual nature of our experiences. There are not very many people who,