category it belongs."[6]*

* La Perception du Changement, pages 12 and 13. 27

According to Bergson the facts which we actually know directly in the
ordinary course are discriminated out of a very much wider field which
we must also be said in a sense to know directly though most of it
lies outside the clear focus of attention. This whole field of virtual
knowledge is regarded as standing to the actual facts to which we
usually devote our attention, much as, for instance, the whole
situation of stumbling upon something in a dark room stood to the
single quality of roughness: in both cases there is a central point in
the full focus of attention which we are apt to look upon as the fact
directly known, but this central point is really surrounded by a
vastly wider context and this too is known in some sense though it is
commonly ignored.

For all philosophies, whether they be Bergson's or the view of common
sense or any other, the actual facts which require to be explained are
the same, and, though any positive assertion as to what these facts
are may be hotly disputed, it will probably be admitted that as we
ordinarily know them they consist in some direct experience,
undeniable as far as it goes. The point at issue between Bergson and
common sense is, precisely, how far it does go. Both sides would admit
that, in this fact directly known, what is in the full focus of
attention at any given moment is very limited; on the other hand both
would admit that this fully focussed fact is set in a context, or
fringe, with no clearly defined limits which also goes to make up the
whole fact directly known though we do not usually pay much attention
to it. The fact directly known being given the problem is to find out