a drive can rehabilitate the army--and by this mechanical means hide the
lack of a definite program for liquidating the war. At the same time, it
is clear that such an advance cannot but completely disorganize the army
by setting up its various units one against the other."

* * * * *

The military events were developing amid ever increasing difficulties in
the internal life of the nation. With regard to the land question,
industrial life, and national relations, the coalition government did
not take a single resolute step forward. The food and transportation
situations were becoming more and more disorganized. Local clashes were
growing more frequent. The "Socialistic" ministers were exhorting the
masses to be patient. All decisions and measures, including the calling
of the Constituent Assembly, were being postponed. The insolvency and
the instability of the coalition regime were obvious.

There were two possible ways out: to drive the bourgeoisie out of power
and promote the aims of the revolution, or to adopt the policy of
"bridling" the people by resorting to repressive measures. Kerensky and
Tseretelli clung to a middle course and only muddled matters the more.
When the Cadets, the wiser and more far-sighted leaders of the coalition
government, understood that the unsuccessful military advance of June
18th might deal a blow not only to the revolution, but also to the
government temporarily, they threw the whole weight of responsibility
upon their allies to the left.

On the 2nd of July came a crisis in the ministry, the immediate cause of
which was the Ukrainian question.