set down deviations from it to the account of the ignorance or the
perversity of our fellowmen. So regarded, they are aberrations from the
normal, and only true code of conduct; interesting, perhaps, but little
enlightening, for they can have little bearing upon our conception of
what we ought to do.

A presumption against this arbitrary assumption that we have the one and
only desirable code is suggested the unthinking acceptance of the
traditional by those who are lacking in enlightenment and in the capacity
reflection. Is it not significant that a contact with new ways of
thinking has a tendency, at least, to make men broaden their horizon and
to revise some of their views?

In other fields, we hope to attain to a capacity for self-criticism. We
expect to learn from other men. Why should we, in the sphere of morals,
lay claim to the possession of the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth? Why should we refuse to learn from anyone? Such a position
seems unreasoning. It puts moral judgments beyond the pale of argument
and intelligent discussion. It is an assumption of infallibility little
in harmony with the spirit of science. The fact that a given standard of
conduct is in harmony with our traditions, habits of thought, and
emotional responses, does not prove to other men that it is, not one of a
number of accepted codes, but in a quite peculiar sense acceptable, a
thing to put in a class by itself--the class into which each mother puts
her own child, as over against other children.

Moreover, such an unreasoned assumption of superiority must make one
little sympathetic in one's attitude toward the moral life of other
peoples. Into the significance of their social organization, of their
customs, their laws, one can gain no insight. Their hopes, their fears,