the counsel of his impetuous general. Maharbal turned away, and, with
mingled reproach and impatience, exclaimed, "Alas! thou knowest how to
gain a victory, but not how to use one." The great commander, while he
knew he was invincible in the open field, did not think it prudent to
fight the Romans behind their walls.

Hannibal now sent an embassy to Rome to offer terms of peace. The Senate,
true to the Appian policy never to treat with a victorious enemy (see p.
245), would not even permit the ambassadors to enter the gates. Not less
disappointed was Hannibal in the temper of the Roman allies. For the most
part they adhered to the cause of Rome with unshaken loyalty through all
these trying times. Some tribes in the South of Italy, however, among
which were the Lucanians, the Apulians, and the Bruttians, went over to
the Carthaginians. Hannibal marched into Campania and quartered his army
for the winter in the luxurious city of Capua, which had opened its gates
to him. Here he rested and sent urgent messages to Carthage for re-
inforcements, while Rome exhausted every resource in raising and equipping
new levies, to take the place of the legions lost at Cannae. For several
years there was an ominous lull in the war, while both parties were
gathering strength for a renewal of the struggle.

THE FALL OF SYRACUSE AND OF CAPUA.--In the year 216 B.C., Hiero, King of
Syracuse, who loved to call himself the friend and ally of the Roman
people, died, and the government fell into the hands of a party unfriendly
to the republic. An alliance was formed with Carthage, and a large part of
Sicily was carried over to the side of the enemies of Rome. The
distinguished Roman general, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, called "the Sword
of Rome," was intrusted with the task of reconquering the island. After
reducing many towns, he at last laid siege to Syracuse.