The storm being violent and many of our own ships in most perilous
situations, I found it necessary to order the captures,--all without
masts, some without rudders & many half full of water--to be
destroyed, except such as were in better plight, for my object was
their ruin & not what might be made of them. As this filled our ships
with prisoners and the wounded in a miserable condition, I sent a flag
to the Marquis of Solana [6] to offer him his wounded men, which was
received with every demonstration of joy and gratitude, & two French
Frigates & a Brigg were sent out for them. In return, he offered me
his Hospitals & the security of Spanish honour that our wounded should
have every care & every comfort that Spain could afford, so you see,
my dear Sir, though we fight them, we are upon very good terms.

But what most astonished them was our keeping the sea after such an
action, with our injured masts and crippled ships, which I did the
longer to let them see that no efforts of theirs could drive a British
Squadron from its station.


This letter is of exceptional interest since it throws fresh light on a
matter which has now afforded food for controversy for over a century.
Nelson's dying injunctions had been that the fleet was to anchor. Owing,
it was contended, to Collingwood having failed promptly to carry out these
instructions of the master mind, many prizes were lost. James, who in his
_Naval History_ is severe in his criticism of Collingwood's error of
judgment in this particular, has further pointed out that four ships which
did anchor on the evening of the engagement weathered the gale
successfully. This letter of Collingwood gives his reasons for his course
of action. It proves that although when he did give the order to anchor
its execution was impracticable, yet that he had strong reason for