already disposed of by the refutation of the view that knowledge
(consciousness) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman; Brahman
being in reality the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we
understand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as
'consciousness, bliss is Brahman,' therefore mean 'consciousness--the
essential character of which is bliss--is Brahman.' On this identity of
the two things there rests that homogeneous character of Brahman, so
much insisted upon by yourself. And in the same way as numerous passages
teach that Brahman, while having knowledge for its essential nature, is
at the same time a knowing subject; so other passages, speaking of
Brahman as something separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere
bliss but a subject enjoying bliss; cp. 'That is one bliss of Brahman'
(Taitt. Up. II, 8, 4); 'he knowing the bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II,
9, 1). To be a subject enjoying bliss is in fact the same as to be a
conscious subject.

We now turn to the numerous texts which, according to the view of our
opponent, negative the existence of plurality.--'Where there is duality
as it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'There is not any plurality here; from
death to death goes he who sees here any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19);
'But when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means, and whom,
should he see?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15) &c.--But what all these texts deny
is only plurality in so far as contradicting that unity of the world
which depends on its being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and
having Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. They
do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on Brahman's part which
depends on its intention to become manifold--a plurality proved by the
text 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). Nor can our
opponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of plurality
contained in other passages this last text refers to something not real;