distinguished by these and other good qualities it constitutes the Self
of the entire world; and then finally proceeds to instruct Svetaketu
that this Brahman constitutes his Self also ('Thou art that'). We have
fully set forth this point in the Vedartha-samgraha and shall establish
it in greater detail in the present work also, in the so-called
arambhana-adhikarana.--In the same way the passage 'the higher knowledge
is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, &c.' (Mu. Up. I, 1,
5) first denies of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakriti,
and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-pervadingness,
subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperishableness, creativeness with
regard to all beings, and other auspicious qualities. Now we maintain
that also the text 'True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman', does not
prove a substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the
co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains itself in so
far only as denoting one thing distinguished by several attributes. For
'co-ordination' (samanadhikaranya, lit.'the abiding of several things in
a common substrate') means the reference (of several terms) to one
thing, there being a difference of reason for the application (of
several terms to one thing). Now whether we take the several terms,'
True','Knowledge','Infinite', in their primary sense, i. e. as denoting
qualities, or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary
to those qualities; in either case we must needs admit a plurality of
causes for the application of those several terms to one thing. There is
however that difference between the two alternatives that in the former
case the terms preserve their primary meaning, while in the latter case
their denotative power depends on so-called 'implication' (lakshana).
Nor can it be said that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge,
&c.(which is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of lakshana),
constitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one
non-differenced substance; the three terms thus having one purport