means so criminal as that of modern sovereigns, who have employed
the arm of violence and terror against the religious opinions of
any part of their subjects. From their reflections, or even from
their own feelings, a Charles V. or a Lewis XIV. might have
acquired a just knowledge of the rights of conscience, of the
obligation of faith, and of the innocence of error. But the
princes and magistrates of ancient Rome were strangers to those
principles which inspired and authorized the inflexible obstinacy
of the Christians in the cause of truth, nor could they
themselves discover in their own breasts any motive which would
have prompted them to refuse a legal, and as it were a natural,
submission to the sacred institutions of their country. The same
reason which contributes to alleviate the guilt, must have tended
to abate the vigor, of their persecutions. As they were
actuated, not by the furious zeal of bigots, but by the temperate
policy of legislators, contempt must often have relaxed, and
humanity must frequently have suspended, the execution of those
laws which they enacted against the humble and obscure followers
of Christ. From the general view of their character and motives
we might naturally conclude: I. That a considerable time elapsed
before they considered the new sectaries as an object deserving
of the attention of government. II. That in the conviction of
any of their subjects who were accused of so very singular a
crime, they proceeded with caution and reluctance. III. That
they were moderate in the use of punishments; and, IV. That the
afflicted church enjoyed many intervals of peace and tranquility.
Notwithstanding the careless indifference which the most copious
and the most minute of the Pagan writers have shown to the
affairs of the Christians, ^24 it may still be in our power to
confirm each of these probable suppositions, by the evidence of