Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute by Theo. F. Rodenbough
page 45 of 129 (34%)
page 45 of 129 (34%)
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At that time the Russian General Kaufmann was operating on the
northern border of Afghanistan with a force of fifteen thousand men and sixty guns, and the Ameer had reason to think that he could rely on Russian cooperation against the English, who, with a force of forty thousand men, promptly invaded his dominion. This force moved into Afghanistan in four columns, under the command, respectively, of Generals Browne, Roberts, Biddulph, and Stewart, with reserves under Generals Maude and Primrose. We shall have occasion later to consider some of the details of the protracted operations which followed. They embraced several admirably conducted marches, exposure to excessively severe winter weather, the successful surmounting of great natural obstacles, the development of the usual weakness in the department of transport, with unnecessary losses in animals, a considerable sick-list, and an inconsiderable proportion of killed and wounded in action. The military benefits were those resulting from a long and arduous field experience in a rough country. The interruption to these actual "field manoeuvres," this "fire-drill," by the enemy, was comparatively feeble,--as a rule, stimulating the Anglo-Indian force to put its best foot foremost. Under this system, at the end of the two years' campaign, all departments of the army had become moulded into the efficient machines essential to success in any military venture. Politically, the campaign had been a failure. The fate of the gallant Major Cavagnari and his mission, murdered at Kabul, September 3, 1879, made a deeper impression on the Afghan mind than |
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