the time, but of living at the beck and call of passion, and following
each object as it rises. For to them that are such the knowledge comes
to be unprofitable, as to those of imperfect self-control: but, to
those who form their desires and act in accordance with reason, to have
knowledge on these points must be very profitable.

Let thus much suffice by way of preface on these three points, the
student, the spirit in which our observations should be received, and
the object which we propose.

[Sidenote: IV] And now, resuming the statement with which we commenced,
since all knowledge and moral choice grasps at good of some kind or
another, what good is that which we say [Greek: _politikai_] aims at?
or, in other words, what is the highest of all the goods which are the
objects of action?

So far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement: for HAPPINESS
both the multitude and the refined few call it, and "living well" and
"doing well" they conceive to be the same with "being happy;" but about
the Nature of this Happiness, men dispute, and the multitude do not in
their account of it agree with the wise. For some say it is some one of
those things which are palpable and apparent, as pleasure or wealth or
honour; in fact, some one thing, some another; nay, oftentimes the same
man gives a different account of it; for when ill, he calls it health;
when poor, wealth: and conscious of their own ignorance, men admire
those who talk grandly and above their comprehension. Some again held it
to be something by itself, other than and beside these many good things,
which is in fact to all these the cause of their being good.

Now to sift all the opinions would be perhaps rather a fruitless task;