cause with her, if Jackson had battered down the doors of her
penitentiary to release a man who, her courts insisted, had been
properly convicted of a serious crime. A court can do nothing
short of justice. The executive power, perhaps, may sometimes
rightly act or decline to act from motives of national policy.

In one instance the armed forces of a State were actually
engaged, under the authority of the legislature, in forcibly
resisting the service of process from the federal courts. It was
in 1809, when the marshal in Pennsylvania was opposed by a large
body of the militia called out by order of the Governor for the
purpose. Their commanding officer was subsequently arrested and
convicted for the offense in the Circuit Court of the United
States.[Footnote: Wharton's State Trials, 48; McMaster, "History
of the People of the U. S.," V, 405; Willoughby, "The American
Constitutional System," 41, 43.]

In 1859, the Governor of Ohio refused to honor a requisition from
the Governor of Kentucky for the surrender of a fugitive from
justice. The act charged was assisting a slave to escape. This
was a crime in the State from which the man had fled, but not in
the State where he had found refuge. The Supreme Court of the
United States was asked by Kentucky to compel the surrender. It
held that the Governor had violated his duty, but that the
Constitution of the United States furnished no means for
enforcing its performance by him.[Footnote: Kentucky _v._
Dennison, 24 Howard's Reports, 66, 109.] Under the shelter of
this doctrine, a man indicted for murder in Kentucky has been for
several recent years residing in safety in Indiana, because the
Governor of that State has refused to comply with repeated