health, are as powerful, their actions are as necessary, as those which
decide the wise man to manage his. But, it will be insisted, the
debauchee may be prevailed on to change his conduct; this does not imply
that he is a free agent; but, that motives may be found sufficiently
powerful to annihilate the effect of those that previously acted upon
him; then these new motives determine his will to the new mode of
conduct he may adopt, as necessarily as the former did to the old mode.

Man is said to _deliberate_ when the action of the will is suspended;
this happens when two opposite motives act alternately upon him. To
deliberate, is to hate and to love in succession; it is to be
alternately attracted and repelled; it is to be moved sometimes by one
motive, sometimes by another. Man only deliberates when he does not
distinctly understand the quality of the objects from which he receives
impulse, or when experience has not sufficiently apprised him of the
effects, more or less remote, which his actions will produce. He would
take the air, but the weather is uncertain; he deliberates in
consequence; he weighs the various motives that urge his will to go out
or to stay at home; he is at length determined by that motive which is
most probable; this removes his indecision, which necessarily settles
his will either to remain within or to go abroad: this motive is always
either the immediate or ultimate advantage he finds or thinks he finds
in the action to which he is persuaded.

Man's will frequently fluctuates between two objects, of which either
the presence or the ideas move him alternately: he waits until he has
contemplated the objects or the ideas they have left in his brain; which
solicit him to different actions; he then compares these objects or
ideas: but even in the time of deliberation, during the comparison,
pending these alternatives of love and hatred, which succeed each other