his palate; of not preferring it to that which he knows to be
disagreeable or dangerous? It is always according to his sensations, to
his own peculiar experience, or to his suppositions, that he judges of
things either well or ill; but whatever way be his judgment, it depends
necessarily on his mode of feeling, whether habitual or accidental, and
the qualities he finds in the causes that move him, which exist in
despite of himself.

All the causes which by his will is actuated, must act upon him in a
manner sufficiently marked, to give him some sensation, some perception,
some idea, whether complete or incomplete, true or false; as soon as his
will is determined, he must have felt, either strongly or feebly; if
this was not the case he would have determined without motive: thus, to
speak correctly, there are no causes which are truly indifferent to the
will: however faint the impulse he receives, whether on the part of the
objects themselves, or on the part of their images or ideas, as soon as
his will acts, the impulse has been competent to determine him. In
consequence of a slight, of a feeble impulse, the will is weak, it is
this weakness of the will that is called _indifference_. His brain with
difficulty perceives the sensation, it has received; it consequently
acts with less vigour, either to obtain or remove the object or the idea
that has modified it. If the impulse is powerful, the will is strong, it
makes him act vigorously, to obtain or to remove the object which
appears to him either very agreeable or very incommodious.

It has been believed man was a free agent, because it has been imagined
that his soul could at will recall ideas, which sometimes suffice to
check his most unruly desires. Thus, the idea of a remote evil
frequently prevents him from enjoying a present and actual good: thus,
remembrance, which is an almost insensible, a slight modification of his