his brain? He is not more master of the obstacles; they are the
necessary effects of either interior or exterior causes, which always
act according to their given properties. A man insults a coward, who is
necessarily irritated against his insulter, but his will cannot vanquish
the obstacle that cowardice places to the object of his desire, which
is, to resent the insult; because his natural conformation, which does
not depend upon himself, prevents his having courage. In this case the
coward is insulted in despite of himself, and against his will is
obliged patiently to brook the insult he has received.

The partizans of the system of free-agency appear ever to have
confounded constraint with necessity. Man believes he acts as a free
agent, every time he does not see any thing that places obstacles to his
actions; he does not perceive that the motive which causes him to will
is always necessary, is ever independent of himself. A prisoner loaded
with chains is compelled to remain in prison, but he is not a free
agent, he is not able to resist the desire to emancipate himself; his
chains prevent him from acting, but they do not prevent him from
willing; he would save himself if they would loose his fetters, but he
would not save himself as a free agent, fear or the idea of punishment
would be sufficient motives for his action.

Man may therefore cease to be restrained, without, for that reason,
becoming a free agent: in whatever manner he acts, he will act
necessarily; according to motives by which he shall be determined. He
may be compared to a heavy body, that finds itself arrested in its
descent by any obstacle whatever: take away this obstacle, it will
gravitate or continue to fall; but who shall say this dense body is free
to fall or not? Is not its descent the necessary effect of its own
specific gravity? The virtuous Socrates submitted to the laws of his