induced to expect: in consequence, such an unsociable man would be
chastised; he would be rendered miserable, and according to the nature
of his crime he would be excluded from society as a being but little
calculated to concur in its views.

If society has the right to conserve itself, it has also the right to
take the means: these means are the laws which present or ought to
present to the will of man those motives which are most suitable to
deter him from committing injurious actions. If these motives fail of
the proper effect, if they are unable to influence him, society, for its
own peculiar good, is obliged to wrest from him the power of doing it
further injury. From whatever source his actions may arise, therefore,
whether they are the result of free-agency, or whether they are the
offspring of necessity, society coerces him if, after having furnished
him with motives, sufficiently powerful to act upon reasonable beings,
it perceives that these motives have not been competent to vanquish his
depraved nature. It punishes him with justice, when the actions from
which it dissuades him are truly injurious to society; it has an
unquestionable right to punish, when it only commands those things that
are conformable to the end proposed by man in his association; or
defends the commission of those acts, which are contrary to this end;
which are hostile to the nature of beings associated for their
reciprocal advantage. But, on the other hand, the law has not acquired
the right to punish him: if it has failed to present to him the motives
necessary to have an influence over his will, it has not the right to
coerce him if the negligence of society has deprived him of the means of
subsisting; of exercising his talents; of exerting his industry; of
labouring for its welfare. It is unjust, when it punishes those to whom
it has, neither given an education, nor honest principles; whom it has
not enabled to contract habits necessary to the maintenance of society: