Washington stated the case, fairly, in the terse expression: "They have
been accustomed, officers and men alike, to have their own way too long
already."

The rapidly succeeding methods through which that mass of fiery patriots
became a well-ordered army, obedient to authority, and accepting the
delays and disappointments of war with cheerful submission, will stand
as the permanent record of a policy which cleared the way for an assured
liberty.

As early as 1775, Lord Dartmouth had asserted, with vigor, that Boston
was worthless as a base, if the authority of the Crown was to be
seriously defied by the colonies, acting in concert. He advocated the
evacuation of Boston, and the consolidation of the royal forces at New
York. Washington, early after his arrival at Cambridge, saw that the
British commander had made a mistake. His letters to Congress are full
of suggestions which citizens could only slightly value, so long as they
saw Boston still under British control. It is difficult to see how the
war could have been a success, if New York had been occupied, in force,
by Lord Howe in 1775, and the rashness of Gates had not precipitated the
skirmish at Lexington and the battle of Bunker Hill. It is no less hard
to see where and how Washington could have found time, place, and
suitable conditions for that practical campaign experience which the
siege of Boston afforded.

The mention of some of these incidents will suggest others, and
illustrate that experience.

A practical siege was undertaken, under the most favorable
circumstances. The whole country, near by, was in sympathy with the