toward Montreal. This was based upon the idea that the conquest of
Canada would not only protect New England on the north, but compel the
British commanders to draw all supplies from England. The fact is noted,
as evidence of the constant regard which the American commander had for
every exposed position of the enemy which could be threatened, without
neglecting the demands of the siege itself. Frequent attempts were made
to force the siege to an early conclusion. The purpose was to expel or
capture the garrison before Great Britain could send another army, and
open active operations in other colonies, and not, merely in the
indolence of the mere watchdog, to starve the enemy into terms. "Give me
powder or ice, and I will take Boston," was the form in which Washington
demanded the means of bombardment or assault, and gave the assurance
that, if the river would freeze, he would force a decisive issue with
the means already at command.

Meanwhile, he sent forth privateers to scour the coast and search for
vessels conveying powder to the garrison; and soon no British transport
or supply-vessel was secure, unless under convoy of a ship-of-war.

At last, Congress increased the army to twenty-four thousand men and
ordered a navy to be built. Washington redoubled his efforts, confident
that Boston was substantially at his mercy; but seeing as clearly that
the capture or the evacuation of the city would introduce a more general
and desperate struggle, and one that would try his army to the most.

At this juncture, General Howe was strongly reinforced. When he
succeeded Gates, on the tenth of October, 1775, he "assumed command of
all his Britannic Majesty's forces, from Nova Scotia to Florida," and
thus indicated his appreciation of the possible extent of the American
resistance. It was a fair response to the claim of Washington to