much imbecility, both in the councils and armies of the allied powers,
for Austria to improve this momentary success. Buonaparte perceived that
the conquest of Italy was within his reach; treaties, and the rights of
neutral or of friendly powers, were as little regarded by him as by
the government for which he acted. In open contempt of both he entered
Tuscany, and took possession of Leghorn. In consequence of this
movement, Nelson blockaded that port, and landed a British force in
the Isle of Elba, to secure Porto Ferrajo. Soon afterwards he took the
Island of Capraja, which had formerly belonged to Corsica, being less
than forty miles distant from it; a distance, however, short as it was,
which enabled the Genoese to retain it, after their infamous sale of
Corsica to France. Genoa had now taken part with France: its government
had long covertly assisted the French, and now willingly yielded to the
first compulsory menace which required them to exclude the English from
their ports. Capraja was seized in consequence; but this act of vigour
was not followed up as it ought to have been. England at that time
depended too much upon the feeble governments of the Continent, and too
little upon itself. It was determined by the British cabinet to evacuate
Corsica, as soon as Spain should form an offensive alliance with France.
This event, which, from the moment that Spain had been compelled to make
peace, was clearly foreseen, had now taken place; and orders for the
evacuation of the island were immediately sent out. It was impolitic to
annex this island to the British dominions; but having done so, it was
disgraceful thus to abandon it. The disgrace would have been spared, and
every advantage which could have been derived from the possession of
the island secured, if the people had at first been left to form a
government for themselves, and protected by us in the enjoyment of their
independence.

The viceroy, Sir Gilbert Elliott, deeply felt the impolicy and