had learnt from an American on the 5th, that the English had only nine
ships, which was indeed the case when his informer had seen them; for a
reinforcement of five ships from England, under Admiral Parker, had not
then joined, and the CULLODEN had parted company. Upon this information
the Spanish commander, instead of going into Cadiz, as was his intention
when he sailed from Carthagena, determined to seek an enemy so inferior
in force; and relying, with fatal confidence, upon the American account,
he suffered his ships to remain too far dispersed, and in some disorder.
When the morning of the 14th broke, and discovered the English fleet,
a fog for some time concealed their number. That fleet had heard their
signal-guns during the night, the weather being fine though thick and
hazy; soon after daylight they were seen very much scattered, while the
British ships were in a compact little body. The look-out ship of the
Spaniards, fancying that her signal was disregarded because so little
notice seemed to be taken of it, made another signal, that the English
force consisted of forty sail of the line. The captain afterwards said
he did this to rouse the admiral; it had the effect of perplexing him
and alarming the whole fleet. The absurdity of such an act shows what
was the state of the Spanish navy under that miserable government by
which Spain was so long oppressed and degraded, and finally betrayed. In
reality, the general incapacity of the naval officers was so well known,
that in a pasquinade, which about this time appeared at Madrid, wherein
the different orders of the state were advertised for sale, the greater
part of the sea-officers, with all their equipments, were offered as a
gift; and it was added, that any person who would please to take them,
should receive a handsome gratuity. When the probability that
Spain would take part in the war, as an ally of France, was first
contemplated, Nelson said that their fleet, if it were no better than
when it acted in alliance with us, would "soon be done for."