History of Modern Philosophy - From Nicolas of Cusa to the Present Time by Richard Falckenberg
page 38 of 811 (04%)
page 38 of 811 (04%)
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_Grundzüge der Philosophie des Nikolaus Cusanus mit besonderer
Berücksichtigung der Lehre vom Erkennen_, Breslau, 1880. R. Eucken, _Beiträge zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_, Heidelberg, 1886, p. 6 seq.; Joh. Uebinger, _Die Gotteslehre des Nikolaus Cusanus_, Münster, 1888. Scharpff, _Des Nikolaus von Cusa wichtigste Schriften in deutscher Uebersetzung, Freiburg i. Br_., 1862.] Human knowledge and the relation of God to the world are the two poles of the Cusan's system. He distinguishes four stages of knowledge. Lowest of all stands sense (together with imagination), which yields only confused images; next above, the understanding (_ratio_), whose functions comprise analysis, the positing of time and space, numerical operations, and denomination, and which keeps the opposites distinct under the law of contradiction; third, the speculative reason (_intellectus_), which finds the opposites reconcilable; and highest of all the mystical, supra-rational intuition (_visio sine comprehensione, intuitio, unio, filiatio_), for which the opposites coincide in the infinite unity. The intuitive culmination of knowledge, in which the soul is united with God,--since here even the antithesis of subject and object disappears,--is but seldom attained; and it is difficult to keep out the disturbing symbols and images of sense, which mingle themselves in the intuition. But it is just this insight into the incomprehensibility of the infinite which gives us a true knowledge of God; this is the meaning of the "learned ignorance," the _docta ignorantia_. The distinctions between these several stages of cognition are not, however, to be understood in any rigid sense, for each higher function comprehends the lower, and is active therein. The understanding can discriminate only when it is furnished by sensation with images of that which is to be discriminated, the reason can combine only when the understanding has supplied the results of analysis as material for combination; while, on the other hand, it is the understanding which is |
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