Crown. They were to carry with them a double force--a force of
coercion, visible and palpable; a force addressed to conscience,
neither visible nor palpable, and in its nature only capable of
being inwardly appreciated. Was it then unreasonable that they
should bear outwardly the tokens of that power to which they were
to be indebted for their outward observance, and should work only
within by that wholly different influence that governs the kingdom
which is not of this world, and flows immediately from its King?
... But while, according to the letter and spirit of the law, such
appear to be the limits of the Royal Supremacy in regard to the
_legislative_, which is the highest, action of the Church, I do
not deny that in other branches it goes farther, and will now
assume that the supremacy in all causes, which is at least a claim
to control at every point the jurisdiction of the Church, may also
be construed to mean as much as that the Crown is the ultimate
source of jurisdiction of whatever kind.

Here, however, I must commence by stating that, as it appears to
me, Lord Coke and others attach to the very word jurisdiction a
narrower sense than it bears in popular acceptation, or in the
works of canonists--a sense which excludes altogether that of the
canonists; and also a sense which appears to be the genuine and
legitimate sense of the word in its first intention. Now, when we
are endeavouring to appreciate the force and scope of the legal
doctrine concerning ecclesiastical and spiritual jurisdiction, it
is plain that we must take the term employed in the sense of our
own law, and not in the different and derivative sense in which it
has been used by canonists and theologians. But canonists
themselves bear witness to the distinction which I have now
pointed out. The one kind is _Jurisdictio coactiva proprie dicta,