render judgments in antagonism with its terms, and that marshals and
sheriffs who should, as ministerial officers, execute processes
sanctioned by State laws and issued by State judges in execution of
their judgments could be brought before other tribunals and there
subjected to fine and imprisonment for the performance of the duties
which such State laws might impose. The legislation thus proposed
invades the judicial power of the State. It says to every State court or
judge, If you decide that this act is unconstitutional; if you refuse,
under the prohibition of a State law, to allow a negro to testify; if
you hold that over such a subject-matter the State law is paramount, and
"under color" of a State law refuse the exercise of the right to the
negro, your error of judgment, however conscientious, shall subject
you to fine and imprisonment. I do not apprehend that the conflicting
legislation which the bill seems to contemplate is so likely to occur as
to render it necessary at this time to adopt a measure of such doubtful
constitutionality.

In the next place, this provision of the bill seems to be unnecessary,
as adequate judicial remedies could be adopted to secure the desired end
without invading the immunities of legislators, always important to be
preserved in the interest of public liberty; without assailing the
independence of the judiciary, always essential to the preservation of
individual rights; and without impairing the efficiency of ministerial
officers, always necessary for the maintenance of public peace and
order. The remedy proposed by this section seems to be in this respect
not only anomalous, but unconstitutional; for the Constitution
guarantees nothing with certainty if it does not insure to the several
States the right of making and executing laws in regard to all matters
arising within their jurisdiction, subject only to the restriction that
in cases of conflict with the Constitution and constitutional laws of