the United States the latter should be held to be the supreme law of the
land.

The third section gives the district courts of the United States
exclusive "cognizance of all crimes and offenses committed against the
provisions of this act," and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit
courts of the United States of all civil and criminal cases "affecting
persons who are denied or can not enforce in the courts or judicial
tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights
secured to them by the first section." The construction which I have
given to the second section is strengthened by this third section, for
it makes clear what kind of denial or deprivation of the rights secured
by the first section was in contemplation. It is a denial or deprivation
of such rights "in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State." It
stands, therefore, clear of doubt that the offense and the penalties
provided in the second section are intended for the State judge who, in
the clear exercise of his functions as a judge, not acting ministerially
but judicially, shall decide contrary to this Federal law. In other
words, when a State judge, acting upon a question involving a conflict
between a State law and a Federal law, and bound, according to his own
judgment and responsibility, to give an impartial decision between the
two, comes to the conclusion that the State law is valid and the Federal
law is invalid, he must not follow the dictates of his own judgment, at
the peril of fine and imprisonment. The legislative department of the
Government of the United States thus takes from the judicial department
of the States the sacred and exclusive duty of judicial decision, and
converts the State judge into a mere ministerial officer, bound to
decide according to the will of Congress.

It is clear that in States which deny to persons whose rights are