These are circumstances which demand our attention, and point out
the necessity of naval protection.

Some, perhaps, will say, that after we have made it up with Britain,
she will protect us. Can we be so unwise as to mean,
that she shall keep a navy in our harbours for that purpose?
Common sense will tell us, that the power which hath endeavoured
to subdue us, is of all others the most improper to defend us.
Conquest may be effected under the pretence of friendship;
and ourselves after a long and brave resistance, be at last cheated
into slavery. And if her ships are not to be admitted into our harbours,
I would ask, how is she to protect us? A navy three or four thousand miles
off can be of little use, and on sudden emergencies, none at all.
Wherefore, if we must hereafter protect ourselves, why not do it for ourselves?

The English list of ships of war, is long and formidable, but not
a tenth part of them are at any one time fit for service, numbers of them
not in being; yet their names are pompously continued in the list,
if only a plank be left of the ship: and not a fifth part of such as are
fit for service, can be spared on any one station at one time.
The East and West Indies, Mediterranean, Africa, and other parts
over which Britain extends her claim, make large demands upon her navy.
From a mixture of prejudice and inattention, we have contracted a false
notion respecting the navy of England, and have talked as if we should
have the whole of it to encounter at once, and for that reason, supposed,
that we must have one as large; which not being instantly practicable,
have been made use of by a set of disguised Tories to discourage
our beginning thereon. Nothing can be farther from truth than this;
for if America had only a twentieth part of the naval force of Britain,
she would be by far an overmatch for her; because, as we neither have,