of the Nile mouths, had it in their power to direct their attack to any
point that might seem to them at once most important and most
vulnerable.

Under these circumstances the Athenian general, Iphicrates, strongly
recommended a dash at Memphis. The main strength of the Egyptian army
had been concentrated at Pelusium. Strong detachments held the other
mouths of the Nile. Memphis, he felt sure, must be denuded of troops,
and could probably be carried by a _coup de main_; but the advice of the
rapid Greek was little to the taste of the slow-moving and cautious
Persian. Pharnabazus declined to sanction any rash enterprise--he would
proceed according to the rules of art. He had the advantage of
numbers--why was he to throw it away? No, a thousand times no. He would
wait till his army was once more collected together, and would then
march on Memphis, without exposing himself or his troops to any danger.
The city would be sure to fall, and the object of the expedition would
be accomplished. In vain did Iphicrates offer to run the whole risk
himself--to take no troops with him besides his own mercenaries, and
attack the city with them. As the Greek grew more hot and reckless, the
Persian became more cool and wary. What might not be behind this
foolhardiness? Might it not be possible that the Greek was looking to
his own interests, and designing, if he got possession of Memphis, to
set himself up as king of Egypt? There was no knowing what his intention
might be; and at any rate it was safest to wait the arrival of the
troops. So Pharnabazus once more coolly declined his subordinate's
offer.

Nectanebo, on his side, having thrown a strong garrison into Memphis,
moved his army across the Delta from the Pelusiac to the Mendesian
branch of the Nile, and having concentrated it in the neighbourhood of