accepted by both, gave vitality and hope to the struggle. When the issue
ripened at New York, and, swiftly as possible, the besieging force
before Boston became the resisting force at New York, there was one man
who understood the exact issue. The temper of the British press, and
that of the British House of Commons, was fully appreciated by the
American Commander-in-chief. He knew that General Gage had urged that
"thirty thousand men, promptly sent to America, would be the quickest
way to save blood and end the war." He also knew that when John Wesley
predicted that "neither twenty, forty, nor sixty thousand men would
suppress the rebellion," the British Cabinet had placed before
Parliament a careful statement of the entire resources which were deemed
available for military purposes abroad. As early as May, 1776,
Washington was advised of the following facts:--

First, That the contracts at that time made with continental States,
including that with Hesse and Brunswick, would place at British disposal
a nominal strength of fifty-five thousand men.

Second, That, with all due allowance for deficiencies, the effective
force, as claimed by the ministry, could not exceed, but might fall
below, forty thousand men.

The debate in Parliament was so sharp, and the details of the proposed
operations were so closely defined and analyzed, that Washington had
full right to assume, as known, the strength of his adversary.

When, during May, 1776, the American Congress sent troops from New York
to Canada, he sharply protested, thus: "This diversion of forces will
endanger both enterprises; for Great Britain will attempt to capture New
York as well as Canada, if they have the men." He did not believe that