they would capture New York, if he could acquire and retain the force
which he demanded.

The point to be made emphatic, is this: That, from the date of the call
of Massachusetts, early in 1775, for thirty thousand men, up to the
occupation of New York, the force which he had the right to assume as at
his own disposal was equal to the contingencies of the conflict; and
that, when he did occupy New York, and begin its exterior defences at
Brooklyn, the British ministry had admitted its inability to send to
America a force sufficiently strong to capture the city. The maximum
force proposed was less than that which Congress could easily supply for
resistance. In other words, Washington would not have to fight Great
Britain, but a specific force; namely, all that Great Britain could
spare for that service; so that the issue was not between the new
Republic and England, but between the Republic and a single army, of
known elements and numbers. In fact, the opinion that France had already
made war upon England had so early gained credit, that Washington, while
still in New York, was forced to issue an order correcting the rumor,
and thus prevent undue confidence and its corresponding neglect to meet
the demands of the crisis.

Thus far, it is clear that there was nothing extravagant in the American
claim to independence; nor in the readiness of Washington to seize and
hold New York; nor in his belief that the colonial resources were equal
to the contest.

One other element is of determining value as to the necessity for his
occupation and defence of Brooklyn Heights. New York was the only base
from which Great Britain could operate against the colonies as an
organized State. By Long Island Sound and the Hudson River, her right