would strengthen the trend of American life toward a general exaltation
of nationality.

On the other hand, their differences--

Seward approached the problem in the same temper, with the same
assumptions, that were his in the previous December. He still believed
that his main purpose was to enable a group of politicians to save their
faces by effecting a strategic retreat. Imputing to the Southern leaders
an attitude of pure self-interest, he believed that if allowed to play
the game as they desired, they would mark time until circumstances
revealed to them whether there was more profit for them in the Union or
out; he also believed that if sufficient time could be given, and if no
armed clash took place, it would be demonstrated first, that they did
not have so strong a hold on the South as they had thought they had;
and second, that on the whole, it was to their interests to patch up the
quarrel and come back into the Union. But he also saw that they had a
serious problem of leadership, which, if rudely handled, might make it
impossible for them to stand still. They had inflamed the sentiment of
state-patriotism. In South Carolina, particularly, the popular demand
was for independence. With this went the demand that Fort Sumter in
Charleston Harbor, garrisoned by Federal troops, should be surrendered,
or if not surrendered, taken forcibly from the United States. A few
cannon shots at Sumter would mean war. An article in Seward's creed of
statecraft asserted that the populace will always go wild over a war. To
prevent a war fever in the North was the first condition of his policy
at home. Therefore, in order to prevent it, the first step in saving his
enemies' faces was to safeguard them against the same danger in their
own calm. He must help them to prevent a war fever in the South. He saw
but one way to do this. The conclusion which became the bed rock of his