generally are only occupied with matters of opinion, and with the
production and action and passion of this sensible world. But the highest
truth is that which is eternal and unchangeable. And reason and wisdom are
concerned with the eternal; and these are the very claimants, if not for
the first, at least for the second place, whom I propose as rivals to
pleasure.

And now, having the materials, we may proceed to mix them--first
recapitulating the question at issue.

Philebus affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be one
nature; I affirmed that they were two natures, and declared that knowledge
was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that the two together were
more eligible than either taken singly; and to this we adhere. Reason
intimates, as at first, that we should seek the good not in the unmixed
life, but in the mixed.

The cup is ready, waiting to be mingled, and here are two fountains, one of
honey, the other of pure water, out of which to make the fairest possible
mixture. There are pure and impure pleasures--pure and impure sciences.
Let us consider the sections of each which have the most of purity and
truth; to admit them all indiscriminately would be dangerous. First we
will take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the impure--the art which
uses the false rule and the false measure? That we must, if we are any of
us to find our way home; man cannot live upon pure mathematics alone. And
must I include music, which is admitted to be guess-work? 'Yes, you must,
if human life is to have any humanity.' Well, then, I will open the door
and let them all in; they shall mingle in an Homeric 'meeting of the
waters.' And now we turn to the pleasures; shall I admit them? 'Admit
first of all the pure pleasures; secondly, the necessary.' And what shall