from the calculation of probabilities; and as this is so much the more
the case, the more the War has a bias that way, from the circumstances
out of which it has arisen--the smaller its motives are, and the
excitement it has raised--so it is also conceivable how out of this
calculation of probabilities even motives to peace may arise. War does
not, therefore, always require to be fought out until one party is
overthrown; and we may suppose that, when the motives and passions are
slight, a weak probability will suffice to move that side to which it
is unfavourable to give way. Now, were the other side convinced of this
beforehand, it is natural that he would strive for this probability
only, instead of first wasting time and effort in the attempt to achieve
the total destruction of the enemy's Army.

Still more general in its influence on the resolution to peace is the
consideration of the expenditure of force already made, and further
required. As War is no act of blind passion, but is dominated by the
political object, therefore the value of that object determines the
measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased. This will be
the case, not only as regards extent, but also as regards duration.
As soon, therefore, as the required outlay becomes so great that the
political object is no longer equal in value, the object must be given
up, and peace will be the result.

We see, therefore, that in Wars where one side cannot completely disarm
the other, the motives to peace on both sides will rise or fall on each
side according to the probability of future success and the required
outlay. If these motives were equally strong on both sides, they would
meet in the centre of their political difference. Where they are strong
on one side, they might be weak on the other. If their amount is only
sufficient, peace will follow, but naturally to the advantage of that