side which has the weakest motive for its conclusion. We purposely pass
over here the difference which the POSITIVE and NEGATIVE character of
the political end must necessarily produce practically; for although
that is, as we shall hereafter show, of the highest importance, still
we are obliged to keep here to a more general point of view, because the
original political views in the course of the War change very much, and
at last may become totally different, JUST BECAUSE THEY ARE DETERMINED
BY RESULTS AND PROBABLE EVENTS.

Now comes the question how to influence the probability of success.
In the first place, naturally by the same means which we use when
the object is the subjugation of the enemy, by the destruction of his
military force and the conquest of his provinces; but these two means
are not exactly of the same import here as they would be in reference to
that object. If we attack the enemy's Army, it is a very different
thing whether we intend to follow up the first blow with a succession
of others, until the whole force is destroyed, or whether we mean
to content ourselves with a victory to shake the enemy's feeling of
security, to convince him of our superiority, and to instil into him a
feeling of apprehension about the future. If this is our object, we only
go so far in the destruction of his forces as is sufficient. In like
manner, the conquest, of the enemy's provinces is quite a different
measure if the object is not the destruction of the enemy's Army. In the
latter case the destruction of the Army is the real effectual action,
and the taking of the provinces only a consequence of it; to take them
before the Army had been defeated would always be looked upon only as
a necessary evil. On the other hand, if our views are not directed upon
the complete destruction of the enemy's force, and if we are sure that
the enemy does not seek but fears to bring matters to a bloody decision,
the taking possession of a weak or defenceless province is an advantage