in itself, and if this advantage is of sufficient importance to make
the enemy apprehensive about the general result, then it may also be
regarded as a shorter road to peace.

But now we come upon a peculiar means of influencing the probability
of the result without destroying the enemy's Army, namely, upon the
expeditions which have a direct connection with political views. If
there are any enterprises which are particularly likely to break up the
enemy's alliances or make them inoperative, to gain new alliances for
ourselves, to raise political powers in our own favour, &c. &c., then
it is easy to conceive how much these may increase the probability of
success, and become a shorter way towards our object than the routing of
the enemy's forces.

The second question is how to act upon the enemy's expenditure in
strength, that is, to raise the price of success.

The enemy's outlay in strength lies in the WEAR AND TEAR of his forces,
consequently in the DESTRUCTION of them on our part, and in the LOSS of
PROVINCES, consequently the CONQUEST of them by us.

Here, again, on account of the various significations of these means, so
likewise it will be found that neither of them will be identical in its
signification in all cases if the objects are different. The smallness
in general of this difference must not cause us perplexity, for in
reality the weakest motives, the finest shades of difference, often
decide in favour of this or that method of applying force. Our only
business here is to show that, certain conditions being supposed,
the possibility of attaining our purpose in different ways is no
contradiction, absurdity, nor even error.